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I. Introduction
To preserve public confidence in the judiciary “[j]ustice must satisfy the
appearance of [j]ustice.”1 Satisfying the appearance of justice necessarily imposes
a duty of impartiality on judges.2 The public’s confidence in this impartiality is
essential to a functioning judicial branch, and this duty requires a high standard
of conduct for judges.3 Society understandably holds lawyers to a higher standard
of conduct than the general public; and the standard for a judge must be higher
still.4 A judge’s heightened standard of conduct applies both on and off the bench
and extends beyond actual acts of impropriety to encompass those acts that may
give even the appearance of impropriety.5
In Neely v. Wyoming Commission on Judicial Conduct & Ethics,6 the Wyoming
Supreme Court addressed the extent to which a judicial committee may regulate
the speech and conduct of a judge in order to preserve public confidence in the
judicial branch.7 Ultimately, the court ordered a public censure of Judge Neely for
her misconduct.8 In ordering Judge Neely’s public censure, the court held Judge
Neely had violated several rules of the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct (Code
1

Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

See Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 24, 390 P.3d
728, 737–38 (Wyo. 2017).
2

In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287, 1292 (N.Y. 2003) (“[W]ithout public confidence, the
judicial branch could not function.”).
3

4
In re Piper, 534 P.2d 159, 164 (Or. 1975). (“Just as an attorney is held by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to standards of integrity and ethical conduct higher than that required
for ordinary persons . . . because the office of judge is one of even greater trust and confidence,
a judge must be held by the Canons of Judicial Ethics . . . [t]o standards of integrity and ethical
conduct higher than those required for attorneys.”). See also The Federalist No. 78, at 465
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5
Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1 r. 1.2 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011) (“Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance
of impropriety. This principle applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge.”);
In re Roth, 645 P.2d 1064, 1068– 69 (Or. 1982) (“The purview of Canon 2A, therefore, is conduct
by a judge, on or off the bench, in an official or personal capacity, which has a detrimental effect
upon the public’s perception of the judiciary.”).

On January 8, 2018, The United States Supreme Court denied Judge Neely’s petition for
writ of certiorari. Neely, 390 P.3d 728, petition for cert. denied, 2018 LEXIS 103* (U.S. Jan. 8, 2018)
(No. 17-195).
6

7

Neely, ¶ 27, 390 P.3d at 738.

8

Id. at ¶ 74, 390 P.3d at 753.
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of Judicial Conduct).9 While the court imposed an appropriate sanction on Judge
Neely, it mistakenly found violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 2.2
and 2.3(B).10 In fact, the only appropriate sanction was pursuant to Rule 1.2.11
The fact that a general, catch-all rule is the only rule available to sanction actions
such as Judge Neely’s, is suggestive of the need for the creation of a new rule, to
ensure that there is uniformity of decisions moving forward.12
This case note focuses on the Neely court’s discussion of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judicial
branch.13 First, it discusses the legal backdrop to Neely and the Code of Judicial
Conduct.14 Next, it outlines the facts of the case and the majority and dissenting
opinions.15 Third, it argues that the Wyoming Supreme Court imposed the correct
sanctions on Judge Neely, but for improper reasons.16 Finally, it proposes that,
because Rule 1.2 is the only provision available to sanction a judge’s expressed
intent to refuse to apply the law in the future, it is necessary to enact a new rule
that will adequately address such behavior.17

II. Background
A. The Right to Marry
Looming in the background of Neely are the Wyoming Supreme Court’s
Guzzo v. Mead and the United States Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges
9

Id. at ¶ 73, 390 P.3d at 752.

10

See infra notes 187–240 and accompanying text.

11

Id. at ¶ 66, 390 P.3d at 750.

As it stands, this rule is by its nature, likely to provide inconsistent results. Ronald D.
Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA Judicial
Code, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1337, 1373 (2006) (“One of the nice things about charging ‘appearances
of impropriety’ is that one does not have to be consistent, because ‘appearances’ require weighing
and considering each case as unique, so there is no precedent. . . . But law is not supposed to be
like that.”).
12

Neely, ¶ 2, 390 P.3d at 732. In Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, the
Wyoming Supreme Court examined many divergent issues. Id. at ¶¶ 1–3, 390 P.3d 728, 732.
However, for the purposes of this case note and its limited scope, the note will discuss only the
Code of Judicial Conduct and the necessity that the public maintain its confidence in the judiciary,
as covered by Neely. For a critical analysis on freedom of speech, strict scrutiny, or the Wyoming
Constitution, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267 (2007);
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 67 (1960); Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the
Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 773 (2008); Charles
W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 67, 86 n.48 (prac. ed., 1986); see also People v. Morely, 725
P.2d 510, 516 (Colo. 1986); Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Rozbicki, 595 A.2d 819, 825 (Conn.
1991); Robert Keiter, The Wyoming Constitution (G. Alan Tarr ed., 2nd ed. 2017).
13

14

See infra notes 18–57 and accompanying text.

15

See infra notes 58 –143 and accompanying text.

16

See infra notes 144 –252 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 144–252 and accompanying text.
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decisions.18 In the wake of these cases, Neely is not about whether same-sex
couples have the right to marry, they do.19 However, Guzzo and Obergefell played
an indispensable role in creating the situation that resulted in Neely. The law, as
established by Guzzo and Obergefell, made Judge Neely’s announcement that she
would not perform any same-sex marriage ceremonies a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.20 Therefore, a complete analysis warrants a brief summary of
these cases.21

1. Guzzo v. Mead
Wyoming Statute § 20-1-101 defines marriage as a “civil contract between
a male and a female person.”22 In Guzzo, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the statute.23 The plaintiffs were same-sex couples who had
been denied marriage licenses in Wyoming, a married, same-sex, Canadian
couple whose marriage Wyoming refused to recognize, and a Wyoming LGBT
advocacy organization.24 The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction to
prevent Wyoming from limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, arguing that
Wyoming’s definition of marriage violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the United States Constitution.25
After weighing the factors governing preliminary injunctions, the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming held that it was bound by
18
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014).

Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 3, 390 P.3d 728,
732 (Wyo. 2017). (“This case is not about same-sex marriage or the reasonableness of religious
beliefs . . . [t]his case is also not about imposing a religious test on judges. Rather, it is about
maintaining the public’s faith in an independent and impartial judiciary that conducts its judicial
functions according to the rule of law, independent of outside influences, including religion, and
without regard to whether a law is popular or unpopular.”). Throughout the decision, the majority
does not consider whether same-sex marriage is legal, but instead focuses on the freedom of speech
and judicial conduct implications. See id.
19

20

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

As the validity of law regarding right to marry is not at issue here, the overview of both
cases is very brief. For a more thorough analysis of these cases and same-sex marriage, see Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 148481 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014); Courtney G. Joslin et al., Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender Family Law § 8:2 (2017); Katherine G. Porter, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015), 42 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 331 (2015).
21

22

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-101 (2017).

23

Guzzo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481, at *1.

24

Id. at *3.

Id. at *2, *11. The Due Process Clause reads: “No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal
Protection Clause reads: “nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” Id.
25
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Tenth Circuit precedent, holding that the states could not prohibit same-sex
marriages.26 Accordingly, the court enjoined Wyoming from “enforcing or
applying Wyoming Statute § 20-1-101, or any other state law, policy, or
practice, as a basis to deny marriage to same-sex couples or to deny recognition
of otherwise valid same-sex marriages entered into elsewhere.”27 The court
further held that “[m]arriage licenses may not be denied on the basis that the
applicants are a same-sex couple.”28 This decision, issued prior to the United
States Supreme Court’s Obergefell opinion, effectively held that same-sex
marriage was legal in Wyoming.29 Then, in 2015, Obergefell cemented this ruling
as the law of the land.30

2. Obergefell v. Hodges
In Obergefell, fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex
partners were deceased, petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court
of the United States, seeking review of a decision from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.31 The Sixth Circuit’s decision held that states
were not constitutionally required to recognize same-sex marriages performed out
of state or to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.32 The United States
Supreme Court granted review and held that the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the states from denying
same-sex couples the right to marry.33 Accordingly, the United States Supreme
Court held that a state “[may not] exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage
on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”34

B. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the Appearance
of Impropriety
The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the first Canons of Judicial
Ethics in 1924, not as a set of black-letter rules, but as a guide of behavior and
principles for all members of the judiciary.35 Although the purpose of the Canons
was to provide structure and guidance to the judiciary, many reacted to the
26

Guzzo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481, at *18.

27

Id. at *21–22.

28

Id. at *22.

29

Id. at *1; Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

30

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584.

31

Id. at 2593.

32

Id. at 2643.

33

Id. at 2598; see infra note 66 and accompanying text.

34

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.

Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Application I(B) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011). The Code of
Judicial Conduct mandates that everyone who performs judicial functions as an officer of a judicial
system, whether a lawyer or not, will be considered a judge for the purpose of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. Id.
35
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Canons with criticism.36 In response to these concerns, and after much revision,
the ABA unanimously adopted the 1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.37 One
noteworthy change in the 1972 revisions was that the Code of Judicial Conduct
became a rigorous, enforceable set of rules rather than merely a suggested moral
compass for judges.38 The 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct contained seven
Canons that became a blend of both standards and rules, as opposed to the 1924
version’s thirty-six provisions.39 For over a decade, the 1972 version of the Code of
Judicial Conduct was widely used as a method for disciplining judges and, by all
accounts, served its intended purpose.40 Nonetheless, in 1986 the ABA’s Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility conducted a review of the
Code and considered input from lawyers, members of the judiciary, and the
public at large.41 This review resulted in the adoption of the 1990 version of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, including new Preamble and Terminology sections.42
The comments included in the 1990 version of the Code of Judicial Conduct
require judges to act at all times in a way that avoids impropriety or the appearance
of impropriety.43
Several additional amendments resulted in the most recent 2007 Code of
Judicial Conduct.44 Drafting the 2007 Code of Judicial Conduct was not a small
undertaking and required an immense compilation of data and reports from

36
Robert McKay, Judges, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Nonjudicial Activities, 1972 Utah
L. Rev. 391, 391 (1972). The Canons were criticized specifically for their reliance on “hortatory”
language, as opposed to providing strict guidance to members of the judiciary in resolving
complicated disputes. Id. These concerns were assuaged when the language was changed from
“should” to “shall”. Id.
37
Charles G. Geyh & W. William Hodes, Reporter’s Notes to the Model Code
Judicial Conduct vii (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009) (“After three years of work by the Special
Committee, the Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by unanimous vote of the ABA House of
Delegates on August 16, 1972. The 1972 Code was designed to be enforceable and was intended to
preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary.”).

of

Model Code of Judicial Conduct Preface (Am. Bar Ass’n 1972). The Preface to the
1972 Judicial Code said: “The canons and text establish mandatory standards unless otherwise
indicated.” Id.
38

39

Geyh & Hodes, supra note 37, at vii.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id. at viii.

Id. (emphasis added); Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A cmt. (Am. Bar Ass’n
1990) (“A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety . . . [e]xamples are the
restrictions on judicial speech imposed by Sections 3(B)(9) and (10) that are indispensable to the
maintenance of the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the judiciary.”).
43

ABA Joint Comm’n to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Report
(2007), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/house_report.
authcheckdam.pdf.
44

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss1/5
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judges, judicial ethics committees, and other informed individuals.45 The rules
addressed in this version of the Code of Judicial Conduct are applicable to a
judge’s conduct both on and off the bench.46 They extend not only to impropriety,
but also to the appearance of impropriety.47
While preparing the 2007 Code of Judicial Conduct, the Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility received substantial input on an
important question: “whether the ‘appearance of impropriety’ concept should
be retained” from the 1990 version of the Code of Judicial Conduct.48 While
some argued for the omission of the phrase “appearance of impropriety” from
the Code of Judicial Conduct, the majority of commentators advocated for its
retention.49 These commentators cited over three decades of supporting precedent
and ultimately persuaded the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility not only to retain the language, but also to relocate it to the very
first Canon.50 The Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
emphasized the importance of “judicial independence, integrity, and impartiality”
by repeatedly using this phrase throughout the rules.51 This language was
redrafted to a freestanding, independent basis for discipline.52 In 2009, Wyoming
adopted a new Code of Judicial Conduct.53 This new Code is based upon the
45
Id. The revisions additionally took place over a more than three-year time span, dozens
of meetings and conferences, and nine public hearings. Id. The revisions were disseminated to
sixteen entities, various committees, and the ABA, as well as being posted periodically on the ABA
website. Id.

In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d 716, 722 (Alaska 1990) (finding that unethical
behavior outside the courtroom diminishes respect for the judiciary); In re Hill, 568 A.2d 361,
373 (Vt. 1989) (finding that the Code reaches into judge’s nonjudicial life); In re Woodworth, 703
P.2d 844, 845 (Kan. 1985) (finding that even in private life, judges are held to higher standards
than others).
46

47

Geyh & Hodes, supra note 37, at 3– 4.

Aba Joint Comm’n, supra note 44, at 4 (“Although it was used in earlier Codes as well, the
Commission took pains to ensure that the three terms appear together whenever appropriate. . . .”).
48

Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 3: Opposing the Report of the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in Light of its Failure to Provide for
Enforceability of the Canon on “Appearance of Impropriety” (Feb. 7, 2007), http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/
JudicialConductResolutions/resol3AppearanceOfImpropriety.html. Among the strongest propo
nents of keeping the “appearance of impropriety” as a black letter rule, was the Conference of Chief
Justices of the state’s highest courts. Id.
49

Aba Joint Comm’n, supra note 44, at 4. The Commission subsequently added a definition
for “impropriety” to the Terminology section. Id.
50

51

Geyh & Hodes, supra note 37, at 19.

52

Id. at 17–19.

Order Repealing the Existing Code of Judicial Conduct and Order Adopting New Wyo.
Code of Judicial Conduct, Wyo. Sup. Ct. (June 23, 2009), http://preview.courts.state.wy.us/
CourtRules/Orders/OrderWyomingCodeOfJudicialConduct_20090701.pdf. The amendments in
the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct that deviate from the ABA’s Code of Judicial Conduct
address Wyoming’s unique judicial selection and retention process. Id. Prior to the adoption of the
2009 Code of Conduct, Wyoming had been using the same Code of Conduct since 1990. Id.
53
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2007 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct.54 Accordingly, Wyoming’s revised Code
of Judicial Conduct reflects the policies underlying the ABA’s 2007 Code of
Judicial Conduct55, which seeks to hold judges to a high ethical standard in order
to foster public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.56
The public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is an indispensable
and key component to a functioning judicial branch.57

III. Principal Case
A. Factual Background
The Mayor and City Council of Pinedale, Wyoming appointed Ruth Neely as
a municipal court judge in 1994.58 As a municipal court judge, Judge Neely hears
a variety of cases arising from town ordinances but does not have the authority
to perform marriages.59 Judge Neely additionally was appointed as a part-time
circuit court magistrate in 2001.60 One of Judge Neely’s primary functions as
a part-time circuit court magistrate is to perform marriages, as authorized by
Wyoming Statute section 5-9-212(a)(iii).61 Although Judge Neely is not a lawyer
and has no formal legal training,62 in addition to her judicial positions, she was a
voting committee member responsible for adopting the amended 2009 Wyoming
Rules of Judicial Conduct.63
As a member of the judiciary, Judge Neely, took an oath swearing to
“[s]upport, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

See In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 1234 (Alaska 2000).

57

See Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct pmbl. (2009).

Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 4, 390 P.3d 728,
733 (Wyo. 2017).
58

59

Id.

60

Id. at ¶ 5, 390 P.3d at 733.

61

Id.

Id. at ¶ 4, 390 P.3d at 733 n.1. Wyoming does not require either its municipal court judges
or its circuit court magistrates to have any legal training in order for an appointment to the bench.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-6-103 (2017). All that is required of municipal court judges is that they be
a qualified elector, appointed by the mayor, and approved by the council. Id. Similarly, all that is
required of part time circuit court magistrates is that they be a qualified elector and reside within
the district in which the circuit court is located. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-201. A “qualified elector” is
defined as: “every citizen of the United States who is a bona fide resident of Wyoming, has registered
to vote and will be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of the election at which he may offer
to vote.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-102.
62

63
John M. Burman, Wyoming Supreme Court Adopts New Code of Judicial Conduct,
Wyoming Lawyer, Aug. 2009, at 40. The 2009 Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct, for which
Judge Neely was on the Committee, included the requirement that judges act in a way that avoided
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety. See id.
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Constitution of the state of Wyoming . . . .”64 As part of this duty, Judge Neely
must comply with and uphold decisions from the United States Supreme Court
interpreting the Constitution. On October 17, 2014, Wyoming issued an
injunctive order in Guzzo v. Mead, prohibiting the state from enforcing or applying
“any . . . state law, policy, or practice, as a basis to deny marriages to same-sex
couples.”65 Obergefell v. Hodges soon followed and prohibited all states from denying
same-sex couples the right to marry.66 Thus, Judge Neely acquired a duty to enforce
these decisions.67 Although part-time magistrates can turn down performing
marriage ceremonies for a variety of secular reasons,68 following the decisions in
Obergefell and Guzzo, magistrates cannot decline to perform a marriage ceremony
based on a parties’ sexual orientation.69 Prior to January 15, 2015, Judge Neely
had never been subject to disciplinary action and was considered a respected
member of the judiciary.70 However, shortly after the decision in Guzzo, Neely
met with Circuit Court Judge Curt Haws, setting in motion the events leading to
her disciplinary action.71
Judge Neely, who is a member of the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod,
and who holds an undisputed, sincere belief that marriage is a union between
one man and one woman,72 informed Judge Haws that she “would not be able
to officiate same-sex marriages due to [her] sincerely held religious beliefs about
what marriage is.”73 Shortly after this conversation, Ned Donovan, a reporter for
the Pinedale Roundup, asked Judge Neely whether she was excited to be able to
perform same-sex marriages.74 Judge Neely responded that although there were
other magistrates who would perform same-sex marriages, she personally would

64
Neely, ¶ 7, 390 P.3d at 733. (quoting Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 20). This oath is required of
all circuit court magistrates. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-203.

Guzzo v. Mead, No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481, at *21– 22 (D.
Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014); see supra notes 18–30 and accompanying text.
65

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); see supra notes 31–34 and
accompanying text.
66

67

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 –05.

Neely, ¶ 6, 390 P.3d at 733. Appropriate secular reasons for turning down officiating a
marriage ceremony includes conflicting hair appointments, football games, illnesses or a preference
for performing marriage ceremonies only for friends. Id. Judge Neely has reportedly officiated at
over 100 marriage ceremonies, with no indication that she has previously refused to perform a
marriage ceremony. Id.
68

69

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; Guzzo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481, at 1*.

70

Neely, ¶¶ 4, 73, 390 P.3d at 733, 753.

71

Id. at ¶ 8, 390 P.3d at 734.

72

Id.

73

Id.

Id. at ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734. Ned Donovan’s phone call to Judge Neely followed the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming’s decision in Guzzo. See id.; Guzzo v. Mead, No.
14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148481 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014).
74
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not perform same-sex marriages.75 Judge Neely had an additional conversation
with Mr. Donovan in which she stated: “When law and religion conflict, choices
have to be made. I have not yet been asked to perform a same-sex marriage.”76 A
few days later, the Pinedale Roundup published Judge Neely’s remarks.77
After being made aware of Judge Neely’s comments and subsequent newspaper articles, the Wyoming Commission of Judicial Conduct and Ethics
(Commission) launched an investigation into Judge Neely’s comments.78 In
response to a letter of inquiry sent by the Commission, Judge Neely affirmed
the accuracy of her comments to the Pinedale Roundup and further stated that
her “conscience, formed by religious convictions, [would] not allow [her] to
solemnize the marriage of two men or two women.”79 She reiterated that she had
not yet been asked to perform a same-sex marriage.80
With the Commission’s investigation underway, Judge Neely sent a letter to
the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee (Committee) seeking guidance on
whether a magistrate could recuse herself from officiating same-sex marriage
ceremonies due to religious convictions.81 She explained that she “could no more
officiate a same-sex wedding than [she could] buy beer for the alcoholic or aid
in another person’s deceit” because “[she could not] knowingly be complicit in
another’s sin.”82 Judge Neely further explained she did not think this position
made her biased.83 The Committee did not respond to Judge Neely’s letter, as it
found Judge Neely was not seeking guidance on a current or unresolved ethical
dilemma, but instead was looking for the Committee to affirm her decision.84
Judge Haws suspended Judge Neely from her part-time circuit court magistrate

75

Neely, ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734.

76

Id. at ¶ 84, 390 P.3d at 754.

77

Id.

Id. at ¶ 10, 390 P.3d at 734. The first article appeared in the Pinedale Roundup on December
9, 2014. Id. The Sublette Examiner subsequently published the article online on December 11,
2014. Id.
78

79

Id. at ¶ 12, 390 P.3d at 734.

80

Id.

81

Id.

Id. Judge Neely filed a motion removing the confidentiality that normally accompanies
all proceedings before the Commission, resulting in access to her communications with the
Commission and the Committee. Id.
82

Id. Judge Neely expressed that she had been the municipal court judge for over 20 years
without a claim of bias or prejudice, and that she believed she would be impartial to homosexuals
the same as she was to habitual liars, thieves, or alcoholics who appear before her on charges. Id.
83

Id. The committee’s role is not to confirm decisions, but rather to aid in the guidance of
resolution of ethical dilemmas. Id.
84
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position on January 15, 2015.85 The Commission concluded there was probable
cause to find a Code violation and referred the matter to its Adjudicatory
Panel.86 The full Commission adopted the Adjudicatory Panel’s findings and
recommendation, and further recommended that Judge Neely be removed from
both judicial positions.87 Shortly thereafter, Judge Neely petitioned the Wyoming
Supreme Court to reject the Commission’s recommendation.88

B. Majority Opinion
The Wyoming Supreme Court considered whether Judge Neely violated the
Code of Judicial Conduct, focusing on the need to promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.89 Although the opinion in Neely
addressed additional issues of import, this case note is limited to the applicability
of the Code of Judicial Conduct to Judge Neely’s conduct and the sanctions
imposed by the Wyoming Supreme Court.90 Writing for the majority, Justice Fox
explained that it was not Judge Neely’s religious beliefs that were at issue but
rather her conduct as a judge.91
The Wyoming Supreme Court held Judge Neely’s announcement that
she would not perform marriages for same-sex couples violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct Rules 1.2, 2.2, and 2.3(B).92 The court imposed a public
censure sanction and held that Judge Neely could either perform marriage
ceremonies regardless of a couple’s sexual orientation or perform no marriage
ceremonies at all.93
Id. Judge Haws did not have the authority to suspend or remove Judge Neely from her
position as a municipal court judge, as appointments to this position are at the discretion of the
mayor and the city council. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-6-103 (2017).
85

86
Id. at ¶ 13, 390 P.3d at 735. The Commission and Judge Neely filed cross-motions for
summary judgment to the Adjudicatory Panel. Id. The Adjudicatory Panel held a hearing following
these motions and held that Judge Neely’s motion for summary judgment was denied, while the
Commission’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted on December 31, 2015. Id.
87

Id.

88

Id. at ¶ 14, 390 P.3d at 735.

89

Id. at ¶¶ 57, 71, 390 P.3d at 747, 751.

Outside the scope of this note, though inescapably relevant, is the Wyoming Supreme
Court’s thorough discussion on the applicability of strict scrutiny and whether both the United
States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution permit the Court to discipline Judge Neely. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text.
90

Neely, ¶ 3, 390 P.3d at 732. It was Judge Neely’s repeated comments that she would not
perform same-sex marriages that were at issue in this case. Id.
91

92

Id.

Id. at ¶ 74, 390 P.3d at 753. The Court held that Judge Neely must make a choice whether
or not to perform marriages regardless of the couple’s sexual orientation. Id. After Judge Neely made
this choice, it would then be the circuit court judge who would have the discretion in determining
whether Judge Neely would be allowed to remain a part-time circuit court magistrate, as this
position is necessarily dependent on each circuit court judge’s needs. Id.
93
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1. Rule 1.1: A Judge Shall Comply with the Law, Including the Code of
Judicial Conduct
The Wyoming Supreme Court first considered Rule 1.1 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which states: “A judge shall comply with the law, including
the Code of Judicial Conduct.”94 Rule 1.1 violations generally occur when a
judge’s conduct violates a criminal law, although, occasionally, there are violations
following a judge’s failure to follow clear procedural rules of law.95 Examples of
Rule 1.1 violations include a judge failing to sentence a defendant to a set time
in jail; a judge failing to comply with state traffic infraction procedures; and a
judge failing to release opinions in compliance with state law.96 The Wyoming
Supreme Court declined to extend Rule 1.1’s requirement to comply with the law
to Judge Neely’s discretionary duty to perform marriages and instead, it found
that, standing alone, her conduct had not violated Rule 1.1.97

2. Rule 1.2: Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary
Next, the Wyoming Supreme Court analyzed whether Judge Neely violated
Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states: “A judge shall act at
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety.”98 The court determined the proper standard to apply
when assessing whether a judge has exhibited the “appearance of impropriety”
was the objective standard contained in the Code of Judicial Conduct
comments.99 This test asks “whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds
a perception that the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that
reflects adversely on the judge’s honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to
serve as a judge.”100 Under these circumstances, this analysis requires the court to

94

Id. at ¶ 59, 390 P.3d at 747– 48 (quoting Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.1 (2009)).

95

Id. at ¶¶ 59– 60, 390 P.3d at 747– 48.

See id. at ¶ 60, 390 P.3d at 748 (citing In re Harkin, 958 N.E.2d 788, 791 (Ind. 2011); In
re Young, 943 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Ind. 2011); In re Bennington, 24 N.E.3d 958, 961 (Ind. 2015);
In re Jones, 55 S.W.3d 243, 248 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2000); In re Perez, 843 N.W.2d 562, 564
(Minn. 2014)).
96

Id. at ¶ 61, 390 P.3d at 748. The court acknowledged, however, that to the extent Judge
Neely violated any other rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct, she had violated Rule 1.1. Id.
97

98

Id. at ¶ 62, 390 P.3d at 748 (quoting Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.2).

Id. at ¶¶ 62–63, 390 P.3d at 749. The court declined to follow either the Mississippi
Supreme Court’s objective person standard, as advocated for by Neely, or Alaska’s standard
advocated for by the Commission, finding no conflict between either party’s proposed standard. Id.
The court further determined that the “objective person” standard articulated in Rule 1.2 Comment
5 necessarily implied that the “reasonable person” would be informed of all “relevant facts and
circumstances.” Id.
99

100

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.2 cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
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determine whether a reasonable person could conclude that Judge Neely’s stated
refusal to perform marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples rendered her unable
to perform her judicial duties impartially.101
Employing this standard, the majority of the court rejected Judge Neely’s
argument that, because her duty to perform marriages was discretionary, her
refusal to perform same-sex marriages would not violate Rule 1.2.102 Instead, the
court held the requirement that judge’s act impartially was not limited to only
certain types of judicial functions, but not to others.103 The Wyoming Supreme
Court also rejected Judge Neely’s argument that solemnizing marriages involves
personally participating in and supporting a marital union as marriage is a civil
contract and does not require the person officiating the ceremony to condone
it.104 Finally, the court rejected Judge Neely’s argument that her stated willingness
to perform other magisterial functions for same-sex couples, or her assertion that
she would help same-sex couples find other judges to perform their marriage
ceremonies, overcame her unequivocal refusal to perform marriages for same-sex
couples.105 The court held Judge Neely’s statements created the perception in
reasonable minds that she lacked independence and impartiality and, therefore,
she had violated Rule 1.2.106

3. Rule 2.2: Impartiality and Fairness
The court next considered Rule 2.2, which states: “A judge shall uphold
and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially.”107 The court found that, as Judge Neely’s primary function as a circuit
court magistrate was to perform marriage ceremonies, her announcement that
she would do so for opposite-sex couples but not same-sex couples interfered with
the fair and impartial performance of her judicial duties.108 Comment 2 to Rule
2.2 states, “Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background
and personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard

101

See Neely, ¶¶ 62– 63, 390 P.3d at 749–50.

102

Id. at ¶ 63, 390 P.3d at 749.

Id. at ¶¶ 63– 64, 390 P.3d at 749 (citing In re Tabor, CJC No. 7251-F-158, 2013 WL
5853965, at *1 (Wash. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Oct. 4, 2013)).
103

Id. at ¶ 65, 390 P.3d at 749–50. When a judge performs a civil marriage ceremony, the
Board concludes that the judge is performing a judicial duty, and thus is required to follow the
Code of Judicial Conduct in the performance of that duty. Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof ’l Conduct,
Op. No. 2015-1, at *1 (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.ohioadvop.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/
Op_15-001.pdf.
104

105

Neely, ¶ 66, 390 P.3d at 750.

106

Id.

107

Id. at ¶ 67, 390 P.3d at 750 (quoting Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.2 (2009)).

Id. (explaining that the law has established that both classes of people are entitled to
marriage and Judge Neely’s stance opposite of this undermines public confidence in the judiciary).
108
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to whether the judge approves or disapproves of the law in question.”109 The court
held that, in light of Rule 2.2 and Comment 2, Judge Neely had improperly
allowed her religious beliefs to interfere with a fair and impartial application of
the law and, thus, had violated Rule 2.2.110

4. Rule 2.3 Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment
Finally, the court turned to Rule 2.3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
determine whether there had been a violation of that rule. Rule 2.3 states:
(A) A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office, including
administrative duties, without bias or prejudice.
(B) A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in
harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or
harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and
shall not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject
to the judge’s direction and control to do so.111
The Comments to Rule 2.3 elaborate on the requirement that judges perform
their judicial duties in an impartial manner, stating: “A judge must avoid conduct
that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.”112 Judge Neely argued
she had no bias or prejudice against same-sex couples and that her comments
to Mr. Donovan did not reflect any such bias or prejudice as they were simply
an expression of her religious beliefs.113 The court was not persuaded by this
argument, finding Judge Neely’s statements were more than a mere expression
of religious beliefs.114 Rather, the court found Judge Neely’s statements to be
an expression of her intent to allow her religious beliefs to supersede the law,
and therefore impede the impartial performance of her judicial duties.115 As
such, Judge Neely would be performing her judicial functions for one class of
109

Id. (quoting Wyo. Code Judicial of Conduct r. 2.2 cmt. 2).

Id. (“Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and personal
philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves
or disapproves of the law in question.”).
110

111

Id. at ¶ 68, 390 P.3d at 750 (quoting Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3).

112

Id. at ¶ 70, 390 P.3d at 751 (quoting Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3 cmt. 2).

113

Id. at ¶ 69, 390 P.3d at 750 –51.

114

Id.

Id. The court determined that given Judge Neely’s public announcement that she would
refuse to perform same-sex marriages, it is very unlikely that any same-sex couple would now
approach Judge Neely to request a marriage. Id.
115
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people, but not another, based on sexual orientation.116 Relying primarily on
Comment 2 to Rule 2.3, the Wyoming Supreme Court held: “Judge Neely’s refusal
to conduct marriages on the basis of a couple’s sexual orientation can reasonably
be perceived to be biased [and therefore] Judge Neely violated Rule 2.3.”117

C. Dissent
Justice Kautz (joined by Justice Davis) argued in dissent that Judge Neely
did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct and therefore discipline was not
appropriate.118 The dissent rejected the majority’s assertion that this case was
not about Judge Neely’s religious beliefs and argued the majority’s conclusions
imposed a religious test on Wyoming judges.119

1. Rule 1.1
Although the dissent concurred with the majority’s conclusion that Judge
Neely had not violated Rule 1.1, it disagreed with the majority’s finding that
Wyoming judges are required by law to perform marriage ceremonies for samesex couples.120 In analyzing Guzzo, the dissent determined that Wyoming officials
are prohibited from denying marriage to same-sex couples “on the basis of any
state law, policy, or practices.”121 The dissent argued Judge Neely’s announcement
that she would not perform same-sex marriages herself because of her religious
beliefs did not constitute a denial or a statement of future denial of marriage
to anyone.122 The dissent concluded that neither Guzzo nor Obergefell created a
requirement for any individual judge or magistrate in Wyoming to perform every
marriage when requested, nor did these cases give any couple the right to insist a
particular judge officiate their wedding.123 Therefore, the dissent determined the
majority incorrectly concluded Judge Neely was required to perform all marriages
or at least all same-sex marriages whenever requested.124
Next, the dissent analyzed the language of Wyoming Statute § 20-1-106(a),
which states: “[e]very district or circuit court judge, district court commissioner,
supreme court justice, [and] magistrate . . . acting in accordance with traditions
116

Id.

Id. at ¶ 70, 390 P.3d at 751 (citing In re Tabor, CJC No. 7251-F-158, 2013 WL 5853965,
at *3 (Wash. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Oct. 4, 2013)) (“A judge must not only be impartial, but must
also be perceived as impartial.”).
117

118

Id. at ¶ 163, 390 P.3d at 769.

119

Id. at ¶ 78, 390 P.3d at 753–54.

120

Id. at ¶¶ 94–99, 390 P.3d at 756–57.

121

Id. at ¶¶ 92–93, 390 P.3d at 755–56.

122

See id. at ¶ 92, 390 P.3d at 755.

123

See id. at ¶¶ 92–94, 390 P.3d at 755–56.

124

See id. at ¶ 98, 390 P.3d at 757.
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or rites for the solemnization of marriage . . . may perform the ceremony of
marriage in this state.”125 Relying on the use of “may,” the dissent concluded
that no particular judge is required to perform any particular marriage ceremony;
no couple has the right to demand a particular judge officiate their wedding;
and judges and magistrates may in fact decline to perform some legal marriage
ceremonies without regard to the reason for such denial.126 The dissent determined
the law requires only that state officials not deny marriage as an institution to
same-sex couples, not that a particular judge perform every requested same-sex
marriage.127 Consequently, the dissent determined Judge Neely’s declarations
that she would not perform marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples did not
result in a failure to comply with the law.128 The dissent based its conclusion on
Judge Neely’s assertion that there were other judges able to perform marriage
ceremonies for same-sex couples.129

2. Rule 1.2
Next, the dissent argued the majority mistakenly found that Judge Neely’s
assertions that she would not perform same-sex marriages meant Judge Neely had
refused to follow any laws.130 The dissent disagreed with the majority finding that
Judge Neely decided to pick and choose the law she would follow, arguing that the
language of Rule 1.2 is vague and the majority overreached in its conclusion.131
The dissent asserted the majority’s opinion would require every Wyoming
judge to perform all requested same-sex marriages.132 Additionally, the dissent
contended that the majority’s opinion imposes a religious test on Wyoming judges
by banning any person with a religious belief opposing same-sex marriages from
being a judge in Wyoming who performs marriages.133 The dissent also criticized
the majority for purportedly using an objective test when instead, according to
the dissent, it employed a subjective test, which led to an incorrect conclusion.134
Concluding a totality of the circumstances consideration was the appropriate
reasonable person test, the dissenting justices reasoned that the majority had

125

Id. at ¶ 94, 390 P.3d at 756 (quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-106(a) (2017) (emphasis

added)).
126
See id. at ¶¶ 95–97, 390 P.3d at 756 –57 (citing in support, magistrates who had declined
to solemnize some marriages due to family commitments, watching a football game, scheduling
conflicts, or a preference to perform weddings only for friends).
127

Id. at ¶ 98, 390 P.3d at 757.

128

Id. at ¶ 99, 390 P.3d at 757.

129

Id. at ¶ 92, 390 P.3d at 755.

130

Id. at ¶ 102, 390 P.3d at 757.

131

Id. at ¶¶ 102– 03, 390 P.3d at 757–58.

132

Id. at ¶ 104, 390 P.3d at 758.

133

Id.

134

Id. at ¶ 106, 390 P.3d at 758.
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failed to apply an objective reasonable person test.135 The dissent stated that an
objective, reasonable person would have concluded that Judge Neely’s statements
did not erode public confidence in an impartial judiciary, nor did her statements
give any appearance of impropriety.136

3. Rule 2.2
Relying on the fact that Judge Neely had yet to be asked to perform a samesex marriage, and thus, had never refused to perform one, the dissent argued that
the plain language of Rule 2.2 makes the rule applicable only to actions, “not
statements made outside the context of a case or an actual request.”137 Further,
the dissent found the actions taken against Judge Neely were in response to her
faith and not her deeds.138 The dissent concluded that Judge Neely did not have
an obligation to perform all marriage ceremonies, and as such found no fault
in a judge refusing to perform a marriage ceremony based on a couple’s sexual
orientation, when there were other judges willing to perform same-sex marriage
ceremonies.139 Accordingly, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s holding that
Judge Neely’s statements constituted a violation of Rule 2.2.140

4. Rule 2.3(B)
Finally, the dissent analyzed Judge Neely’s statements and determined that
they were neither biased nor prejudiced under the definition of those terms.141
The dissent found Judge Neely’s statements simply indicated what her religious
beliefs about marriage were, but did not show that Judge Neely had a leaning
either for or against same-sex couples.142 Lastly, the dissent concluded that Judge
Neely’s announcement that she would not perform marriage ceremonies for
same-sex couples related to her religious beliefs about who may be married, but
it did not relate to the “worth of any individual or class of individuals,” and,
therefore, she did not exhibit a bias or prejudice towards same-sex couples.143
135

See id. at ¶¶ 108– 09, 390 P.3d at 759– 60.

See id. (arguing that as Judge Neely had not yet been asked to perform a same-sex marriage
ceremony, combined with the fact that Wyoming law does not require Judge Neely to perform any
marriages, Judge Neely had not violated Rule 1.2).
136

Id. at ¶ 113, 390 P.3d at 760 – 61 (the words “uphold”, “apply”, and “perform” all indicate
actual action taken by a judge, and “simply cannot apply to a judge’s statement about how her
religious views would come into play at some unknown, future time.”).
137

138

See id.

139

See id.

140

See id. at ¶ 116, 390 P.3d at 761.

Id. at ¶¶ 118–19, 390 P.3d at 761– 62 (defining “bias” as “a leaning of the mind or an
inclination toward one person over another” and “prejudice” as involving “a prejudgment or forming
of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination.”).
141

142

Id. at ¶ 121, 390 P.3d at 762.

143

Id. at ¶ 124, 390 P.3d at 762.
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IV. Analysis
Respect for the law is contingent on both the reality of justice and the
appearance of justice.144 Polls throughout the country show that faith in the
judiciary is at a low point.145 However, how the public perceives the judicial
branch is not a new concern.146 In fact, a judge’s duty to possess the confidence of
the community, by both acting and appearing impartial, has been a concern for
generations.147 As one scholar eloquently wrote:
A government of the people, by the people and for the people
rises or falls with the will and consent of the governed. The
public will not support institutions in which they have no
confidence. The need for public support and confidence is all
the more critical for the judicial branch, which by virtue of its
independence is less directly accountable to the electorate and,
thus, perhaps more vulnerable to public suspicion.148
Maintaining public confidence in an impartial judiciary is critical to the
functioning of the judicial branch, and to maintain the public’s confidence it is
more imperative than ever that judges be held to a high standard of impartiality
and sanctioned when they act with impropriety or partiality.149

144
In re Greenberg, 280 A.2d 370, 372 (1971) (“Without the appearance as well as the fact of
justice, respect for the law vanishes in democracy.”).

Caleb Diehl, Harvard Poll Finds Millennials Have Little Faith in Government, USA Today
College (Apr. 29, 2015), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/04/29/harvard-poll-finds-millennialshave-little-faith-in-government-media (“[M]illennials are split on the U.S. judicial system’s ability
to ‘fairly judge people without bias for race and ethnicity.’” Forty-nine percent said they had “not
much” or “no” confidence in the American justice system.); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Courts, 20 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 178, 178 –79 (1936) (There is a “real and serious
dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect for law which exists in the United States today . . . [c]
ourts are distrusted [which] has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the Bench.”).
145

In re Greenberg, 280 A.2d at 372 (“For generations before and since it has been taught that
a judge must possess the confidence of the community; that he must not only be independent and
honest, but, equally important, believed by all men to be independent and honest . . . . [J]ustice
must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.”)
146

147

Id.

Am. Bar Ass’n, Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the Commission on the 21st Century
Judiciary 10 (2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judind/jeopardy/
pdf/report.authcheckdam.pdf.
148

Id. (“Appearances matter because the public’s perception of how the courts are performing
affects the extent of its confidence in the judicial system. And public confidence in the judicial
system matters a great deal . . . . First, and perhaps foremost, public confidence in our judicial
system is an end in itself.”); Charles G. Geyh et al., Judicial Conduct & Ethics § 1.04 (5th ed.
2015) (“The principle that public officials should not only behave properly, but appear to behave
properly has come to occupy a prominent place in contemporary American political culture.”).
149
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Neely presents the question of which disciplinary actions are available when a
judge announces a future intent to comply with only those laws that do not conflict with her religious beliefs, thereby expressing an intent to act with impropriety.150
This is one of very few cases considering the consequences of a member of the
judiciary merely announcing she will not perform marriage ceremonies for
same-sex couples in the future.151 The Wyoming Supreme Court attempted to
maintain the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary when it sanctioned this
Wyoming Judge for announcing she would not uphold the law with impartiality,
as required by the Code of Judicial Conduct.152 Yet the current Rules available to
the court did not provide a satisfactory conclusion to the case.153

A. The Court Reached a Correct Outcome Based on Rule 1.1
Standing alone, Judge Neely did not violate the Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 1.1. Rule 1.1 states: “A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code
of Judicial Conduct.”154 The Code of Judicial Conduct’s Terminology section
defines “Law” as encompassing “court rules as well as statutes, constitutional
provisions, and decisional law.”155 The majority correctly found that violations
of Rule 1.1 most commonly occur when judges fail to comply with criminal
laws or procedural rules, but not for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
alone.156 For example, a judicial committee removed a Kansas judge from the
bench for violating Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct when he struck
two highway signs with his vehicle, left his vehicle at the scene of the accident, and

150
Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 2, 390 P.3d 728,
732 (Wyo. 2017). What is at issue here is whether a judge may announce that, if called upon, she
will not perform her job impartially, as she is sworn to do. Id.
151
Id. at ¶ 72, 390 P.3d at 752 (citing Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. Of Prof ’l Conduct, Op. No. 2015-1,
at *1 (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.sc.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2015/Op_15-001.
pdf; Wis. Sup. Ct. Judicial Conduct Advisory Comm., Op. No. 15-1, at 1* (Aug. 18, 2015), https://
www.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=146878; Arizona Sup.
Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. No. 15-01, at *1 (Mar. 9, 2015), https://media.azpm.
org/master/document/2015/3/16/pdf/revisedadvisoryopinion15-01.pdf ). The cases cited by the
Neely court are situations where judges were sanctioned for declining to perform a specific couple’s
marriage ceremony on the basis of their sexual orientation. Id. These cases are distinguishable
from the present case, as these judges did not state a future intent to decline to perform marriage
ceremonies based on a parties’ sexual orientation, but rather declined to perform specific, present
requests. See id.
152

See id. at ¶ 76, 390 P.3d at 753; supra notes 58–143 and accompanying text.

153

Id. at ¶ 59, 390 P.3d at 747 (citing Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.1 (2009)).

154

Id. at ¶ 59, 390 P.3d at 747 (citing Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.1 (2009)).

155

Model Code of Judicial Conduct, terminology (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011).

156

Neely, ¶ 59, 390 P.3d at 747– 48; see supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
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failed to contact the police department that had jurisdiction over his accident.157
Another judicial committee sanctioned a judge in Indiana who subsequently
resigned from the bench following his arrest for his involvement in an automobile
crash that resulted in property damage.158 These cases are distinguishable
from the current matter, as they involve independent criminal conduct, not
purely violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct’s mandate to avoid acting or
appearing to act with impropriety.

B. The Court Reached a Correct Outcome and Proper Sanctions Based on
Rule 1.2
Judge Neely eroded public confidence in her impartiality by failing to avoid
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety.159 Rule 1.2 requires a judge to
avoid improper conduct as well as conduct that could create even the appearance
of impropriety.160 It is well accepted that, for the general public, and even for
lawyers, this standard is far too heavy a burden to shoulder.161 However, this is a
burden a judge willingly bears upon taking office.162 The need to maintain public
confidence in the judiciary requires that this standard be enforced rigorously.163
Both the majority and the dissent heavily emphasized Judge Neely’s
initial statement to the Pinedale Roundup reporter, yet it was this statement,
in combination with her other statements, that truly reflected the violation of
Rule 1.2.164 Judge Neely informed both Judge Haws and Mr. Donovan that
she would not perform same-sex marriages, as doing so was in conflict with
her religious beliefs.165 Then, Judge Neely told the Commission that she could
not be complicit in another’s sin, and as such, she would not officiate at any

157
In re Yandell, 772 P.2d 807, 809 –10 (Kan. 1989) (“K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 8-1605 [which]
provides that the driver of a vehicle having an accident with property, must leave identification
and without necessary delay, notify the nearest office of the duly authorized authority. Respondent
clearly did not do that. He not only violated the laws of the State of Kansas, but in addition, the
cease and desist order resulting from an earlier proceeding.”).

In re Weber, 21 N.E.3d 92– 93 (Ind. 2014) (finding Judge Weber violated both Rule 1.1
and Rule 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct due to his Criminal mischief and Drinking While
Under the Influence guilty pleas).
158

159

Neely, ¶ 62, 390 P.3d at 748.

160

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.2 (2009) (emphasis added).

161

See id. r. 1.2 cmts. 1– 3.

Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 194 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Unlike the other branches of
government, the authority of the judiciary turns almost exclusively on its credibility and the respect
warranted by its rulings . . . .”).
162

163

Id.

164

Neely, ¶¶ 9, 69, 83, 390 P.3d at 734, 750, 754 (2017); Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct

r. 1.2.
165

Id. at ¶ 8, 390 P.3d at 734; see supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
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same-sex marriage ceremonies.166 Finally, under oath, Judge Neely affirmed
that her conscience would not allow her to solemnize the marriage of same-sex
individuals.167 Judge Neely’s statements that she would not be impartial when
dealing with same-sex individuals suggest both impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety.168 At the very least, the public should have confidence that a
judge will be fair and impartial in dealing with the responsibilities of office. Judge
Neely’s comments blatantly indicate that she is not and will not be.169
The dissent reached the opposite conclusion because it incorrectly assumed
that Judge Neely’s religious beliefs were the subject of inquiry.170 However, Judge
Neely did not merely state that her religious beliefs compelled her to disapprove
of same-sex marriages.171 Judge Neely went a step further by announcing she
would “not be able to” officiate any same-sex couple’s marriage ceremony, even
though officiating marriages was her primary function as a part-time circuit court
magistrate.172 It was this critical step beyond merely stating her opinion that
subjects her to the current discipline. Judge Neely not only expressed her opinion
that homosexuality is a sin; she repeatedly announced that she would only
perform marriages, one of her judicial duties, for opposite-sex couples but not
for same-sex couples.173 Regardless of her personal beliefs, this was an expressed
intent by a judge to partially apply the law, constituting a violation of Rule 1.2.174
Judge Neely is entitled to her personal beliefs; she is not entitled to permit them
to impact her performance as a judge.175
Although Judge Neely never refused to perform a specific same-sex marriage
ceremony, she expressed bias and prejudice against same-sex couples by declaring
her intent to refuse any marriage request by same-sex couples.176 The majority
correctly concluded that Judge Neely’s conduct was inconsistent with the Code
of Judicial Conduct.177 The dissent, on the other hand, disagreed.178 The dissent
166

Id. at ¶ 11, 390 P.3d at 734; see supra note 82 and accompanying text.

167

Id. at ¶ 12, 390 P.3d 734; see supra note 79 and accompanying text.

Judge Neely’s religious beliefs and personal opinions are irrelevant to the current state
action. Id. at ¶ 3, 390 P.3d 728, 732. Rather, it is Judge Neely’s expression of intent to fail to
impartially uphold and apply the law which are at issue. Id.
168

169

Id. at ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734.

170

See supra notes 118– 43 and accompanying text.

171

See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.

172

See supra note 73–79 and accompanying text.

173

See supra notes 72– 88 and accompanying text.

174

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.2 (2009).

175

See In re Bailey, 541 So.2d 1036, 1039 (Miss. 1989).

176

See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.

Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 71, 390 P.3d 728,
751 (Wyo. 2017); see supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.
177

178

Neely, ¶ 78, 390 P.3d at 753 –54; see supra notes 141– 43 and accompanying text.
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argued that, because other magistrates in Pinedale were willing to perform
marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples, Judge Neely’s statements that she
would not do so herself were not expressions of partiality.179 The dissent
mistakenly assumed that another judge’s willingness to act impartially excused
Judge Neely from her own duty of impartiality.180 One judge’s willingness to
impartially apply the law, as required by oath, is irrelevant to another judge’s duty
to do the same, and does not negate Judge Neely’s expressed bias or prejudice.181
Judge Neely’s statements to Judge Haws, the Pinedale Roundup, and to the
Commission undermine a reasonable person’s confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary and give the appearance of impropriety.182
It is also unpersuasive to argue that Judge Neely was free to refuse to
perform any marriage ceremony, regardless of the reason, because solemnizing
marriages is a discretionary power.183 Certainly, judges and magistrates in
Wyoming can decline to perform certain marriage ceremonies.184 But the dissent
incorrectly asserted that “Wyoming judges may or may not perform weddings
without regard to the reason for their decision.”185 The law does not require judges
and magistrates to perform every marriage ceremony, yet it does require judges
and magistrates to refrain from discriminating on the basis of race, gender,
religion, sex, sexual orientation, or other protected classes.186 Further, the
United States Supreme Court has held that same-sex couples are entitled to civil
marriages on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.187 The
assertion that a judge who declines to officiate a marriage ceremony due to a
scheduling conflict is equivalent to a judge who declines to officiate a marriage
ceremony because she does not agree with the person’s sexual orientation is
inaccurate.188 For the aforementioned reasons, Judge Neely violated Rule 1.2

179

Neely, ¶ 83, 390 P.3d at 754; see supra note 139 and accompanying text.

180

Neely, ¶ 83, 390 P.3d at 754.

181

See id. at ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734.

182

Id. at ¶¶ 8 –12, 390 P.3d at 734–35; see supra notes 98–107 and accompanying text.

183

Neely, ¶ 97, 390 P.3d at 756–57; see supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.

184

Neely, ¶ 97, 390 P.3d at 757; see supra notes 66 – 68 and accompanying text.

185

Neely, ¶ 97, 390 P.3d at 757 (emphasis added); see supra note 126 and accompanying text.

In re Tabor, CJC No. 7251-F-158, 2013 WL 5853965, at * 2 (Wash. Comm’n. Jud.
Conduct Oct. 4, 2013). Two judges from Ohio have both acknowledged that part of their powers
and duties of office include performing marriage ceremonies, and following The United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, their duties now include performing marriage ceremonies
for same-sex couples. Jessie Balmert, Marion Judges Will Marry Gay Couples, Cite Oath, Law, The
Marion Star (July 31, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://www.marionstar.com/story/news/local/2015/07/31/
marion-judges--marry-gay-couples-cite-oath-law/30953365/.
186

187
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075
(2017); see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
188

Neely, ¶ 97, 390 P.3d at 756–57.
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of the Code of Judicial Conduct. However, this is the only rule of the Code
of Judicial Conduct under which the Wyoming Supreme Court could properly
sanction her.189

C. The Court’s Analysis under Rule 2.2 Misunderstands the Purpose
of the Rule
Both the majority and the dissent erred in their analysis of Rule 2.2.190
Rule 2.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads: “A judge shall uphold and apply
the law and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”191
The comments elaborate that, although each judge will bring to the bench unique
beliefs and backgrounds, he must interpret and apply the law regardless of these
beliefs.192 The language of this rule expressly includes the terms “uphold” and
“apply.”193 These terms convey the crucial intent of the rule, which is to ensure
judges follow “the rule of law when deciding cases.”194 This rule applies to all
judges during all cases and decisions.195 In Disciplinary Counsel v. Hale, an Ohio
judge was sanctioned for violating several rules of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
including Rule 2.2.196 In Hale, the judge falsely completed a judgment entry form,
dismissing a case against an attorney who was representing the judge, without
receiving any input from the prosecutor.197 This conduct was found to be a failure
to “uphold and apply” the law in a fair or impartial manner.198 In Disciplinary
Counsel v. McCormack, a judicial committee sanctioned another Ohio magistrate
for violating Rule 2.2’s mandate following an emergency custody motion.199

189

Id. at ¶¶ 62–66, 390 P.3d at 748–50.

190

Id. at ¶¶ 67, 112–16, 390 P.3d at 750, 760– 61.

191

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.2 (2009) (emphasis added).

192

Id. at r. 2.2 cmt. 2.

193

Id. at r. 2.2.

194

Geyh & Hodes, supra note 37, at 27.

195

See Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.2.

196

Disciplinary Counsel v. Hale, 141 Ohio St. 3d 518, 2014-Ohio-5053, 26 N.E.3d 785,

at ¶ 17.
197

Id.

198

Id.

See Disciplinary Counsel v. McCormack, 133 Ohio St. 3d 192, 2012-Ohio-4309, 977
N.E.2d 598, at ¶ 13. As a magistrate, McCormack conducted several hearings over a post-decree
motion to modify child support, as well as numerous other motions filed by both parties. Id. At
these hearings, among other things, McCormack repeatedly “goaded” and chided attorneys to the
point of being asked to recuse himself by one of the party’s attorneys. Id. Throughout the hearings,
McCormack laughed and made faces while witnesses were being cross-examined, answered questions
directed at the witnesses, and asked questions of parties sitting at counsel table while other witnesses
were on the witness stand. Id. Judge McCormack further held hearings on issues not before the
court and failed to rule on several objections of the attorneys, while continuing to call both parties
and their attorneys insulting names. Id.
199
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Following a stipulation, the Judicial Committee sanctioned the magistrate
for, “fail[ing] to allow the parties a meaningful opportunity to present testimony
and evidence on the issues” and for failing to provide a sufficient record.200 The
Judicial Committee further found Magistrate McCormack had improperly
conducted a hearing in which there was no motion pending before the court and
where the parties had no notice of the subject matter of the hearing.201 Both Ohio
cases are distinguishable from Neely. In both cases, the Judicial Committees found
the judge or magistrate had violated Rule 2.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
following behavior that occurred while the judges were performing judicial
duties.202 In Neely, Judge Neely manifested an intention to partially apply the law,
yet her conduct was not during the performance of any judicial duty mandated
by Wyoming or Federal law.203
The majority concluded Judge Neely violated Rule 2.2 because she expressed
she would not apply the law in an impartial manner if called upon, which it
viewed as equivalent to unfairly applying the law.204 However, the plain language
of the rule and the comments do not support this conclusion.205 Judge Neely did
assert that she would not perform same-sex marriage ceremonies if asked, but at
the time, she had not actually refused to perform a same-sex marriage ceremony.206
Therefore, Judge Neely had not yet failed to apply the law or perform a duty of
her judicial office, and thus could not have violated Rule 2.2. If Judge Neely
had, in fact, refused to perform a same-sex marriage ceremony because of the
couple’s sexual orientation, that would have constituted a violation of Rule 2.2.207
However, Judge Neely’s position had not yet ripened into a specific case and, as
such, she had not actually failed to apply any law whatsoever.208
The supporting case law cited throughout the Wyoming Supreme Court’s
opinion is distinguishable from the present matter, as the judges in those cases
200

Id.

201

Id.

Hale, 141 Ohio St. 3d 518, 2014-Ohio-5053, 26 N.E.3d 785, at ¶ 17 (finding a Rule 2.2
violation for conduct occurring while preparing a judicial order); McCormack, 133 Ohio St. 3d 192,
2012-Ohio-4309, 977 N.E.2d 598, ¶ 14 (finding a Rule 2.2 violation for conduct occurring during
a hearing).
202

203
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-212 (2017). Duties of a part-time magistrate include: adminis
tering oaths or affirmations, performing marriage ceremonies, issuing warrants and setting bail,
and conducting small claims trials. Id. Duties of a municipal court judge include issuance of search
warrants, subpoena powers, and ordering fines or imprisonment for contempt of court. Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 5-6-202.

Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 25, ¶ 67, 390 P.3d 728,
750 (Wyo. 2017); see supra notes 108 –10 and accompanying text.
204

205

See Model Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.2 cmt. 2 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2011).

206

See supra notes 76– 80, 137 and accompanying text.

207

See supra notes 58– 88 and accompanying text.

208

Neely, ¶ 74, 390 P.3d at 753.
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actually had refused to perform marriage ceremonies for particular couples
because of the couple’s sexual orientation.209 Judge Neely’s position indicated
only an intent to refuse to impartially apply the law.210 Yet, as noted by the dissent,
the language of the rule applies to actions, not intent.211 The majority itself
impliedly recognized that Judge Neely’s statements to Judge Haws, the Pinedale
Roundup, and the Commission did not reflect action, as it consistently described
Judge Neely’s conduct as something that would occur in the future.212
While the dissent correctly determined Judge Neely had not violated Rule
2.2, it also analyzed immaterial matters in its analysis of this rule.213 Throughout
its opinion, the dissent continually pointed to the use of “may” versus “shall”
in Wyoming Statute § 20-1-106(a).214 The dissent specifically argued that Rule
2.2 was not violated because as Judge Neely did not have a duty to perform any
particular marriage ceremony; she was therefore allowed to refuse to officiate at
all same-sex marriage ceremonies regardless of the reason.215 A judge’s authority to
decline to perform a marriage is irrelevant under this rule.216 The analysis required
by this rule is simply whether Judge Neely applied the law in a biased manner.217
Judge Neely had not yet declined to fairly and impartially uphold and apply the
law and, therefore, could not have violated Rule 2.2.218

209
Id. at ¶ 72, 390 P.3d at 752 (citing Ohio Sup. Ct. Bd. Of Prof ’l Conduct, Op. No. 2015-1,
at *1 (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.sc.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2015/Op_15-001.
pdf; Wis. Sup. Ct. Judicial Conduct Advisory Comm., Op. No. 15-1, at *1 (Aug. 18, 2015), https://
www.wicourts.gov/sc/judcond/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=146878; Arizona Sup.
Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. No. 15-01, at *1 (Mar. 9, 2015), https://media.azpm.org/
master/document/2015/3/16/pdf/revisedadvisoryopinion15-01.pdf ).
210

Id. at ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734.

Id. at ¶ 113, 390 P.3d at 760 – 61. (“The rule, by its terms, applies only to actions, not to
statements made outside the context of a case or an actual request. The words “uphold,” “apply” and
“perform” all relate to action or deliberate inaction by a judge. They simply cannot apply to a judge’s
statement about how her religious views would come into play in the event at some unknown,
future time, some unknown same sex couple insisted that Judge Neely, rather than someone else,
perform their marriage.”).
211

212

See id. at ¶¶ 59 –71, 390 P.3d at 747–52.

213

Id. at ¶¶ 112–16, 390 P.3d at 760– 62.

Id. at ¶¶ 94–96, 390 P.3d at 756 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-106(a) (2017)); see supra
notes 125–29 and accompanying text.
214

215

Neely, ¶ 115, 390 P.3d at 761; see supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text.

216

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.2 (2009).

217

See id.

218

Neely, ¶ 11, 390 P.3d at 734.
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D. Rule 2.3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Only Applies During the
Performance of Judicial Duties
Additionally, the court’s reasoning under Rule 2.3(B) was misplaced.219
Judge Neely’s various statements that she would refuse to perform lawful
same-sex marriage ceremonies because of her opposition to same-sex marriages,
manifested bias and prejudice against couples based on their sexual orientation.220
However, the specific language of the rule is limited to conduct occurring “in the
performance of judicial duties.”221 Judicial duties include “all duties of which the
judge’s office prescribes by law.”222 Judge Neely was not performing a judicial
duty when she responded to the Pinedale Roundup reporter, or when she spoke
with Judge Haws.223 There is a difference between judges acting in their capacity
as judges, and judges performing their official judicial duties.224 Judge Neely
was indeed acting in her judicial capacity when she told Judge Haws she would
not perform same-sex marriages due to her religious beliefs and also when she
responded to Mr. Donovan’s questions about whether she was excited as a judge
to perform same-sex marriages.225 However, Rule 2.3(B) applies only when the
manifestation of bias or prejudice occurs in the performance of judicial duties.226
Judge Neely’s manifestation of bias was not made while performing judicial duties..
A Washington case provides insight into the difference between “judicial
duties” and “judicial capacity.”227 Judge Tabor, a Washington judge, was
sanctioned in 2013 for informing his fellow judges and court personnel during
an administrative meeting that “he felt uncomfortable performing same-sex
marriages and [asked those judges] who did not have similar personal objections
to officiate in his stead over such marriages.”228 In the stipulated agreement,
219

Id. at ¶ 68–71, 390 P.3d at 750 –51.

220

See supra notes 144 –213 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3(B). Due to the public nature of the judiciary, a
judge’s “off-bench” behavior is also subject to scrutiny and it can hardly be argued that a judge is
free to act however they want off-bench and have no fear of repercussions. See generally Howard T.
Markey, The Delicate Dichotomies of Judicial Ethics, 101 F.R.D. 373 (1984); see also In re Discipline
of Anderson, 981 P.2d 426 (Wash. 1999). However, Rule 2.3(B) specifically identifies “in the
performance of judicial duties” as the conduct it seeks to regulate, and as such, off-bench behavior
is not subject to this rule’s scrutiny. Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3(B).
221

222
Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.1 cmt. 2 (“[N]ot a duty of judicial office unless
prescribed by law.”). See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
223

Neely, ¶¶ 8–9, 390 P.3d at 733–34.

See In re Tabor, CJC No. 7251-F-158, 2013 WL 5853965, at *3 (Wash. Comm’n Jud.
Conduct Oct. 4, 2013).
224

225

See supra notes 73 –76 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3(B). Duties considered to be “within judicial
duties” include disciplinary, adjudicatory and administrative duties. Id.
226

227

In re Tabor, 2013 WL 5853965.

228

Id. at *1.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol18/iss1/5

26

Cronin: Judicial Ethics -- Judicial Words May Speak Softer Than Actions,

2018

Case Note

107

Judge Tabor was sanctioned for his statements which created an appearance of
impropriety and violated Canon 1 Rules 1.1 and 1.2 as well as Canon 3 Rule
3.1(C).229 In the stipulated agreement, the Washington Commission concluded
that, although Judge Tabor’s conduct “occurred in the courthouse and in [Judge
Tabor’s] capacity as a judge,” he was not performing his official judicial duties
at the time.230 Thus, In re Tabor demonstrates that a judge can be acting in his
judicial capacity, but not be performing judicial duties.231 The majority’s analysis
that a reasonable person could find Judge Neely manifested a bias and prejudice
against homosexuals is persuasive.232 Yet, it is insufficient, in and of itself, to find
that Judge Neely violated Rule 2.3.233 Her prejudicial comments were not made
specifically in the performance of her judicial duties.234 As such, the majority
incorrectly found a violation under Rule 2.3.235
The dissent concluded that Judge Neely’s conduct did not fit within its
definitions of bias or prejudice.236 The dissent argued Judge Neely’s expression of
her religious beliefs did not manifest bias or prejudice because she said she would
be willing to help same-sex couples find an officiant who was willing to perform
same-sex marriage ceremonies.237 The record simply does not and cannot support
this reasoning, as Judge Neely went further than simply relaying her religious
beliefs.238 Judge Neely stated her position, that as a judge, she would continue
performing opposite-sex marriage ceremonies, but would not perform same-sex
marriages, and thus expressed her intent to treat parties differently based on their
sexual orientation.239

Id. at *2. These rules require judges to act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in their independence, integrity and impartiality, just as the Wyoming Code of Judicial
Conduct requires. See id; Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3(B).
229

230

Id. at *3.

231

Id.

Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 70, ¶¶ 68–71, 390 P.3d
728, 751 (Wyo. 2017).
232

233

Id.

234

Id. at ¶¶ 8 –9, 390 P.3d at 733–34.

235

Id. at ¶ 67, 390 P.3d at 751.

Id. at ¶ 118, 122, 390 P.3d at 762 – 63 (citing Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3 cmt.
2 (2009)); see supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. The dissent further turns to Comment
2, which holds that a “judge is guilty of expressing bias or prejudice by statements which denigrate
the human value or standing of a person based on the fact that they fit within a particular class of
persons.” Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 2.3 cmt. 2.
236

237

Neely, ¶ 121, 390 P.3d at 762; see supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.

Neely, ¶ 11, 390 P.3d at 734; see supra notes 73–88 and accompanying text. Judge Neely
expressly compared homosexual persons to thieves, liars, and perpetual alcoholics. Id. She also
asserted that she did not believe same-sex couples should be allowed to marry, as she believed this
was a right reserved for only opposite-sex couples. Id.
238

239

Id. at ¶ 9, 390 P.3d at 734.
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Ultimately, however, the discussion need not have ever reached the definitions
of either bias or prejudice. Instead, both the dissent and the majority should
have held that Judge Neely did not violate Rule 2.3 because she simply was
not performing her judicial duties when she expressed her intent to refuse to
perform same-sex marriage ceremonies in the future.240 The dissent focused on
determining “accurate definitions of the terms bias and prejudice,” but failed
to properly discuss whether Judge Neely’s statements occurred during the
performance of her judicial duties.241 To properly analyze whether Judge Neely
violated Rule 2.3(B), the dissent should have considered what judicial duties are
and how they differ from judicial capacity.242 Under this analysis, the dissenting
justices would ultimately have reached the same conclusion: that Judge Neely did
not violate Rule 2.3(B).243

E. Wyoming Should Adopt a New Rule to the Code of Judicial Conduct
to Ensure the Public’s Confidence in the Judiciary
The Judicial Committee and the Wyoming Supreme Court correctly
concluded that Judge Neely must be sanctioned for her manifestation of bias
and prejudice towards same-sex couples and for her impermissible expression of
intent to partially uphold and apply the law.244 However, the only rule available
to sanction this type of conduct is Rule 1.2.245 Therefore, this note proposes that
Wyoming adopt a new rule. The law is constantly changing, likewise requiring
that the Code of Judicial Conduct continue to evolve as well.246 Throughout
its opinion, the majority articulated a thorough and sound analysis regarding
Judge Neely’s manifestation of bias and prejudice towards same-sex couples, as
well as her expressed intent to partially uphold the law in the future.247 But the
court overreached when it held that Judge Neely violated rules of the Code of
Judicial Conduct other than Rule 1.2.248
The problem with the majority’s holdings on Rules 2.2 and 2.3(B) is not
that Judge Neely’s statements were permissible. Rather, the problem is with the

Id. at ¶¶ 68 –71, 118 –125, 390 P.3d at 750 –51, 761– 63; see supra notes 216–34 and
accompanying text.
240

241

Neely, ¶¶ 118–124, 390 P.3d at 761–62.

Id. at ¶¶ 117–125, 390 P.3d at 761– 63; In re Tabor, CJC No. 7251-F-158, 2013 WL
5853965, at *3 (Wash. Comm’n Jud. Conduct Oct. 4, 2013); Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r.
2.3(B) (2009); see supra notes 220– 41 and accompanying text.
242

243

Neely, ¶ 125, 390 P.3d at 762– 63.

244

Id. at ¶ 72, 390 P.3d at 752; see supra notes 98–106, 154–58 and accompanying text.

245

Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.2 (2009).

246

Id.

247

See Neely, ¶¶ 61–71, 390 P.3d at 748–51.

248

Id. at ¶ 72, 390 P.3d at 752 (citing Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.2 (2009)).
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specific language of the rules.249 Rules 1.1, 2.2, and 2.3 only provide consequences
for a judge’s impermissible conduct in the performance of judicial duties or
while upholding, complying with, or applying the law, but not when a judge
has only declared an intent to do so.250 At this time, Judge Neely has only
indicated, albeit repeatedly, that she would not impartially apply the law in
the future.251 When a judge states an intent to act with bias, an intent to refuse
to uphold or comply with a law, or an intent to refuse to perform the judicial
duties of office in an impartial manner, that judge has given the appearance of
impropriety. The consequences of such behavior should send a message to the
public that any expressed intent from judges to act with bias and prejudice will
not be tolerated.252
Although it availed in this instance, Rule 1.2 is unlikely to be sufficient for
future purposes.253 The appearance of impropriety standard is a general catch-all
rule, which has been contested for years as being too vague to provide reliable
guidance to judicial committees.254 That is evidenced here by the court’s 3-2
split.255 A rule that strictly prohibits expressions of future intent to partially
apply the law, regardless of personal beliefs, would have insulated the majority
in this case from any attacks that their decision was based on politics, religion,
or applying a subjective test.256 The majority in Neely should have been able to
sanction Judge Neely’s impermissible stance that the law would have to cede to
her personal beliefs, without having to defend that their decision was not about
freedom of religion or freedom of speech, but was rather about a judge’s conduct.257
The new rule this note proposes will create a uniformity in future decisions in
these types of cases.258
249

See supra notes 187–237 and accompanying text.

250

See supra notes 153–54, 187–237 and accompanying text.

251

See supra notes 72–88 and accompanying text.

It is the law, not persons or entities, that ensure an independent court, and as such, a judge
simply cannot treat the bench as a “pulpit or soapbox for self-expression.” In re Velasquez, Decision
and Order (Cal. Comm’n, Apr. 16, 1997) https://cjp.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2016/08/
Velasquez_4-16-97.pdf.
252
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Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.2.

See Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed New
ABA Judicial Code, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1343, 1337, 1340 (2006); see also Nonjudicial Activities of
Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings on S. 1097 and S. 2109 Before the Subcomm.
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1969) (statement of Justice
Arthur Goldberg).
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Neely v. Wyo. Comm’n on Judicial Conduct & Ethics, 2017 WY 70, ¶ 1, 390 P.3d 728,
728 (Wyo. 2017).
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Id. at ¶ 76 –164, 390 P.3d at 753– 69.
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Application of the new rule will provide consistency of sanctions for judges who express an
intent to act with bias or prejudice against any party; whether this bias be on the basis of race, sexual
orientation, religion, or any other impermissible reasoning.
258
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F. This Case Note Proposes the Wyoming Code of Judicial Conduct
Implement a New Rule
The following includes the author’s proposed rule to the Wyoming Code of
Judicial Conduct. “A judge shall not express, declare, or otherwise indicate that the
judge will fail to comply, uphold, or apply the law.” To accompany this new rule,
this note further proposes the following comments. “This rule does not prohibit
a judge from holding or expressing personal opinions or beliefs. Rather, this rule
prohibits a judge from allowing those personal beliefs or opinions to impact or
otherwise dictate the future performance of the judicial office and duties.” This
new rule should be read in conjunction with a judge’s duties to comply with the
law under Rule 1.1.259 Together, both rules shall ensure that a judge does not act
with partiality nor give the appearance of impropriety in any manner which may
impair public confidence in the judicial branch.

V. Conclusion
The Wyoming Supreme Court correctly held Judge Neely violated Rule 1.2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct because she acted in a way that undermined
public confidence in an impartial judiciary.260 However, the language of the
Code of Judicial Conduct simply does not support the majority’s holdings on
Rules 2.2 and 2.3(B).261 Additionally, neither Judge Neely’s actions nor the law,
supports the dissent’s analysis on these rules.262 Although the majority reached
the correct result here, Rule 1.2 is unsatisfactory because it cannot guarantee
that a correct outcome will be consistently reached when a member of the
judiciary blatantly expresses an intent to refuse to follow the oath of their office
and to the people.263 When the only applicable rule available to dispense justice
for a judge’s expressed intent to uphold the law in a partial and biased manner
is the general catch-all provision of Rule 1.2, the law should recognize the insuf
ficiency of this and implement a new rule that will appropriately and consistently
prevent this behavior in the future and admonish the offender appropriately.264
This note does not suggest that members of the judiciary must agree with every
law and opinion handed down by The United States Supreme Court. If a judge
does not like or approve of certain laws, the judge has recourses available to
express this discontent. Judges may express their dissatisfaction with such rules
by writing dissenting, concurring, or even majority opinions that express their
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Wyo. Code of Judicial Conduct r. 1.1 (2009).
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See supra notes 98–106, 158–168 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 107–17, 187–208, 215–31 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 118–43, 209 –14, 233–43 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 248– 53 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 139–257 and accompanying text.
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disapproval with such rule; Justices anticipate this reaction.265 However, judges
are nonetheless required to impartially apply, uphold, and comply with the law at
all times. A statement of future refusal to apply the law should be sanctioned the
same as a present refusal to apply the law.

265
Justice Clarence Thomas, Address Before the Federalist Society at the National Lawyers
Convention: On Judicial Independence (Nov. 12, 1999), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/
clarence-thomas-address-before-the-federalist-society-at-the-1999-national-lawyers-convention
(Justice Clarence Thomas said: “As judges, we must expect that our opinions will be dissected not
only by the parties, but by scholars, journalists, students, politicians, and the bar. . . . Judges can
benefit from constructive criticism to improve the quality of their work, just as anyone can. . . . I am
willing to let my opinions speak for themselves, and it is part of my judicial duty to accept outside
criticism, however, incorrect or unjust, to go by unanswered.”).
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